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Abstract
This paper investigates the politiciansincentives to pursue income redistribution when gov-
ernments are constrained to levy taxes on labor income and this creates distortions. Politicians
who strive to be elected may strategically redistribute through in-kind rather than cash trans-
fers and overprovide consumption of goods. I show that the overprovision of in-kind transfers
reduces the disincentive e¤ects of taxation in labor e¤ort and enlarges the pool of resources for
political redistribution. As a result, politicians are able to implement larger redistributive trans-
fers and improve the well-being of swing voters. Hence, electoral competition for pivotal voters
provides politicians incentives to implement redistributive schedules that reduce distortions in
labor markets and improve the e¢ ciency of the taxation system.
I am grateful for helpful comments from Alessandra Casella, Navin Kartik, Massimo Morelli, Ethan Kaplan, 
Mike Ting, Suresh Naidu, Bernard Salanié, John Huber and seminar participants at Columbia University.
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1 Introduction
Governments modify on a large scale the distribution of income that would be generated by private
markets without public intervention.1The most important component of this redistribution is un-
dertaken by raising taxes in order to fund both cash transfers and the public provision of services
such as health care, education or childcare.2Furthermore, governments are usually constrained to
raise revenues through taxes over earned labor income, capital gains or the consumption of pri-
vate goods. Therefore, the redistribution of market income distorts economic decisions and creates
welfare losses (Feldstein, 1995, 1999; Salanié, 2003). Do ine¢ ciencies generated by taxation a¤ect
the composition of redistributive spending? Has redistribution through in-kind transfers di¤erent
e¤ects on e¢ ciency than cash transfers?
Normative analysis has explored under what circumstances the provision of in-kind transfers
might increase the e¢ ciency of the taxation system (Guesnerie and Roberts, (1984); Gahvari (1994);
and Currie and Gahvari (2008) for a comprehensive survey of the literature). In particular, benev-
olent governments should fund in-kind transfers that increase labor e¤ort in order to reduce distor-
tions generated by income taxation. However, the redistribution of income is a political decision
undertaken by elected politicians who require the support of citizens. Why should politicians
implement policies that increase e¢ ciency?
Indeed, political economy has longly discussed the potential distortions and welfare losses in-
troduced by democratic policymaking (Besley and Coate, 1998; Lizzeri and Persico, 2001). As
an example, recent contributions by Acemoglu et al. (2008, 2010, 2011) point out how political
economy constraints might distort the dynamic resource allocation and the structure of taxation.
Furthermore, in the particular case in which income redistribution is carried out through in-kind
transfers, Epple and Romano (1996a) highlighted the allocative ine¢ ciencies created by the political
use of in-kind transfers.
In contrast with previous contributions, this paper shows that electoral competition might
provide incentives to implement redistributive schedules that reduce the e¢ ciency cost of income
taxation. In fact, politicians who strive to be elected should consider the e¤ect of income redis-
tribution on individualsincentives to work. In particular, politicians might fund in-kind transfers
in order to reduce distortions in labor markets and enlarge the scope of redistribution. Overall,
this paper points out that political competition implements a size and composition of redistributive
spending that minimize the deadweight losses created by income taxation.
1See for instance Alesina and Glaeser (2004) for a comprehensive analysis of redistributive policies in OECD
countries. The scope of interventions range from regulations in labor markets to social insurance and to budget
interventions through taxes and transfers.
2Public Economics usually refers by in-kind transfers the public funding of the consumption of specic commodi-
ties, regardless of whether their production is public or private. These in-kind transfers are signicant and represent
on average one third of the budget and around 15% of GDP in advanced economies. See Currie and Gahvari (2008)
and the OECD Economic Outlook (2009) for detailed data.
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In order to investigate the incentives for political redistribution, I build a static electoral com-
petition model in which politicians propose redistributive policies which require the support of
citizens to be implemented. I consider a competitive economy in which individuals belong to a
nite number of groups. Each group exhibits di¤erent productivities and individuals must choose
their labor e¤ort which is costly in terms of well-being. Individuals value their available income
and the consumption of goods such as health care which can be acquired in private markets. Fur-
thermore, citizens must elect a government which might levy linear taxes over earned labor income
to fund cash and in-kind transfers. Government is choosen from two political parties who credibly
commit to economic policy proposals uniquely to win elections. Furthermore, each political party
holds di¤erentiated xed positions on ideological issues non-related with economic policy. Citizens
exhibit heterogeneous biases toward parties ideological positions. Each voter gives her support
to the party which yields higher well-being given policy platforms, ideological biases and a com-
mon valuation of competing parties. The party that obtains the support of more than half of the
population implements the announced redistributive policies.
Several appealing results emerge from the proposed analysis. I nd that politicians who compete
for o¢ ce have incentives to change the market distribution of income to obtain the support of
citizens. In particular, politicians have incentives to raise taxes and redistribute income toward
groups of voters with lower earning abilities and more pivotal voters who could swing their vote.
However, distortions and output losses generated by income taxation limit the scope of political
redistribution. In order to overcome these limitations, politicians might constrain individuals to
consume more in-kind transfers than the amount of goods that they would buy in private markets if
targeted resources were given in cash. The overprovision of in-kind transfers reduces the disincentive
e¤ects of redistribution in labor e¤ort and enlarges available resources for political redistribution.
As a result, politicians are able to implement redistributive transfers that improve the well-being
of pivotal voters.
Furthermore, politics removes the economy from an e¢ cient competitive market allocation
because of distortions created by income taxation. However this paper shows how the electoral
competition for marginal voters leads politicians to choose a composition of redistributive transfers
that reduce allocative ine¢ ciencies generated by taxation. The idea that incentives to be elected
force politicians to increase e¢ ciency was rst raised by Wittman (1989,1995) but few work has
investigated the welfare enhancing role of political competition. One exception is Besley et al.
(2010) which provides theorical and empirical evidence for the US states on how the extent of
political competition might generate e¢ ciency gains. Another example is Lopez-Rodriguez (2010)
who points out the role of electoral competition to correct externalities and reach allocative e¢ -
ciency. This paper shows that this mechanism could be also present in the political choice of size
and composition of redistributive spending.
Few contributions have analyzed the incentives for political redistribution through in-kind trans-
fers funded with proportional income taxation (Fernandez and Rogerson, 1995; Epple and Romano,
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1996a,b; Gouveia, 1997; Levy, 2005). Nevertheless, these contributions impose severe policy con-
straints in order to ensure the existence of equilibria which limit the generality of their analysis.
In particular, proposed models constrain in-kind transfers to be uniform for all the population
and they do not consider the possibility of redistribution through cash transfers. Furthermore,
individuals income is not the result of labor e¤ort but given as xed. Therefore, it prevents to
examine how workersbehavioral responses to policies a¤ect the characterization of redistributive
schedules.3
In order to overcome the limitations imposed by modeling constraints, this paper presents a
model which builds on the literature of distributive politics established by Lindbeck and Weibull
(1987) and Dixit and Londregan (1996). In particular, by exploiting probabilistic voting I relax
the constraints in policy tools allowing for di¤erential targeting of cash and in-kind transfers across
groups of voters. Moreover, I extend distributive politics contributions considering that voters
income results from labor decisions, and politicians levy taxes over citizensearned income. This
allows to analyze the distortions in labor markets created by redistribution and therefore the trade-
o¤ faced by politicians between e¢ ciency and political redistribution. Furthermore, it permits to
examine how the composition of redistributive spending a¤ects individualsincentives to work and
governmentstax revenues. An appealing result of the analysis shows that politicians consider the
di¤erential impact on governments tax revenues of targeting cash and in-kind transfers among
groups with di¤erent productivities. In particular, politicians have incentives to target high pro-
ductivity groups with in-kind rather than cash to reduce tax losses generated by income taxation.
This paper rationalizes the political use of in-kind transfers as a tool of income redistribu-
tion in the presence of distortionary policy tools. However, this rationalization does not rule out
other sensible explanations proposed in the literature. For instance, the presence of market failures
such as external e¤ects or imperfect information might justify the public funding of in-kind trans-
fers.4Nevertheless, I abstract away potential market imperfections in order to focus the analysis on
the e¤ect of politics on the distribution of income.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, I present the benchmark of a competitive
market allocation. Section III introduces an electoral competition game in order to analyze the
incentives for political redistribution through income taxation, cash and in-kind transfers. Section
IV examines the political choice of income taxation and the allocation of redistributive spending
among groups of voters. Section V discusses how the electoral competition for marginal voters
might improve the e¢ ciency of the taxation system. Finally, the last section concludes and discusses
potential further research.
3Levy (2005) allows the possibility of both cash and in-kind redistribution. However, transfers are constrained
to be uniform across groups and she abstracts labor supply decisions; Meltzer and Richard (1985) allow for uniform
cash transfers and consider income as a result of labor e¤ort but they focus on commodity taxation.
4 In the presence of asymmetric information, in-kind transfers can be used as an screening device to redistribute
toward low income individuals (Nichols and Zeckhauser, 1982; Balckorby and Donaldson, 1988; Bruce and Waldman,
1991). Interdependent preferences such as externalities has also been suggested as one of the leading candidates to
explain the use of in-kind transfers (Currie and Gahvari, 2008).
4
2 The Economy: Market Allocation
Consider an economy with a continuum of citizens whose measure can be normalized to 1. Indi-
viduals are endowed with T = 1 units of time and idiosyncratic abilities . There are J ability
types, fjgJj=1, with measure j . No ability group constitutes a majority of the population.5Each
individual can sell her time in competitive labor markets. The wage per hour of work, wj , in units
of a numeraire commodity, is equal to the productivity associated to her ability type (i.e. wj = j).
Individuals choose the amount of time devoted to work, nj . The rest of their time is enjoyed as
leisure, lj = 1  nj . Therefore, type j individuals market income, yj , is given by:
yj = wjnj = wj(1  lj) (1)
The aggregate income in the market economy is dened as:
y =
JX
j=1
jwjnj (2)
In this economy, perfectly competitive rms produce health services at di¤erent quality levels,
h.6Firms have available a linear technology that requires qh units of the numeraire commodity to
produce one unit of health services at quality h. Individuals have homogeneous preferences over
the consumption of the numeraire commodity, c, health care quality, h, and leisure, l. Preferences
are represented by the following utility function:
U j(cj ; hj ; lj) = u(cj ; hj ; 1  nj) 8j (3)
This function is continuous, twice di¤erentiable, strictly increasing (uc > 0; uh > 0; ul > 0,
where subscripts denote partial derivatives with respect to the identied argument) and strictly
concave (ucc < 0, uhh < 0, ull < 0) in c, h and l. Marginal utilities are bounded away from 0 and
uc(0; h; l) =1, uh(c; 0; l) =1 and ul(c; h; 0) =1. Leisure, health care and numeraire commodity
are assumed to be normal goods.
Competitive rms with constant returns to scale produce whatever quality of health care that
citizens demand at price, ph, equal to marginal cost, q. Individuals choose their supply of labor, nj ,
given the competitive wage associated to their ability level, wj . Furthermore, individuals decide the
quality of health care that they acquire at competitive market price, ph, given the market income
obtained by their labor e¤ort, yj . The residual income is left for consumption of the numeraire
commodity, cj . Thus, ability type j individuals budget constraint is given by:
yj = wjnj = cj + phh
j 8j (4)
5As an alternative, groups could be interpreted as geographic districts (e.g.: states, regions or municipalities) in
which an average individual in district j exhibits a productivity (output per unit of time spent working) of wj .
6For expositional reasons, I focus on health care but the analysis is also valid for other goods that could be subject
to in-kind transfers such as child and elderly care or education.
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The choice problem for an individual who belongs to the group j can be written as:
8i 2 j max
hj ;nj
U j(cj ; hj ; lj) = u(wjnj   phhj ; hj ; 1  nj) s.t. hj  0 and 0  nj  1 (5)
The optimal market choice, (cjm ; hjm ; njm) for individuals with ability type j , satises the FOCs
for an interior optimum such that:
uh(c
j
m ; h
j
m ; 1  njm) = phuc(cjm ; hjm ; 1  njm) 8j (6)
wjuc(c
j
m ; h
j
m ; 1  njm) = ul(cjm ; hjm ; 1  njm) 8j (7)
These relations implictly dene the marshallian demand function for health care quality and
numeraire commodity:
hjm = h
j
m(w
j ; ph) c
j
m = c
j
m(w
j ; ph) 8j (8)
Furthermore, individuals participate into the labor market and their e¤ort choice given by the
labor supply function is implicitly dened by (6) and (7):
njm = n
j
m(w
j ; ph) 8j (9)
Denition (Market Allocation): A competitive market equilibrium is an allocation of numeraire
commodity and health services quality, fcjm ; hjmgJj=1, and a supply of hours of work, fnjmgJj=1, for
each ability type, such that individuals solve problem (5); and competitive rms with constant
returns to scale produce whatever quality of health care that individuals demand at price, ph, equal
marginal cost, q. In equilibrium, the market economy feasibility constraint holds with equality:
JX
j=1
jcjm +
JX
j=1
jphh
j
m =
JX
j=1
jwjnjm (10)
In a competitive equilibrium, the rate at which consumers are willing to trade health services
for numeraire commodity, MRSc;h, is equal for all individuals and equal to the rate at which the
economy is able to transform numeraire into health care quality, MRTh;c. Furthermore, the rate at
which individuals are willing to trade leisure for income is equal to the competitive wage for each
ability type. Hence, Market allocation is Pareto Optimal.
MRSjh;c =MRTh;c = q 8 j 2 f1; :::; Jg (11)
MRSjl;c = w
j 8 j 2 f1; :::; Jg (12)
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Market equilibrium yields an allocation of resources such that individuals who belong to groups
with larger abilities choose higher quality of health services and consume larger amounts of nu-
meraire good than individuals who belong to groups with lower abilities. Furthermore, labor e¤ort
is lower for the more productive individuals. This folllows directly from assumptions about homo-
geneity of preferences and normality of goods.
3 The Polity: Political Game
The economy presented above constitutes a representative democracy where individuals elect a
government to rule economic policy. The government is elected from two o¢ ce-motivated political
parties, P 2 fA;Bg, that compete in elections. Parties are able to make credible commitments
on taxation and spending policies. I assume that voting is costless, nobody abstains and winning
corresponds to obtaining the support of more than half of the population.
The government is able to levy taxes on labor income earned by citizens in competitive markets.
I assume that only a linear income taxation schedule is feasible, 0  t  1. The revenues raised
by income taxation can be devoted to fund both cash (i.e. numeraire commodity) and in-kind
group-specic transfers. In-kind transfers take the form of non-tradable conditional transfers that
citizens can only spend to acquire health care in private markets.
Let sjP denote the cash transfer targeted to group j and tP be the linear income tax commited
by party P . Furthermore, politicians can target groups with in-kind transfers, hjgP , which marginal
cost is equal to the market price, ph. Politicians can credibly commit to a policy platform xP =
(tP ; fsjP gJj=1; fhjgP gJj=1) to be implemented if party P wins the elections. The promised allocation
of cash and in-kind transfers across groups by political parties must satisfy the governments budget
constraint:
JX
j=1
jsjP +
JX
j=1
jphh
j
gP = tP
JX
j=1
jwjnjP  tP yP (13)
Citizens care about their economic well-being represented by preferences (3) and have access
to labor and health care competitive markets. Once one of the parties P wins the elections,
individuals who belong to di¤erent ability groups make labor decisions, njP , at their wage level, w
j ,
obtaining net income equal to zjP = w
j(1  tP )njP + sjP . Furthermore, the quality of health services
under government P by group j could be supplemented at competitive price in private markets,
hjP = h
j
gP +h
j
mP . The residual net income is devoted to the consumption of numeraire commodity,
cjmP = z
j
P   phhjmP .
Furthermore, parties hold xed and di¤erentiated positions in some dimension non-related to
economic policy such as ideological issues. Citizens care about these non-economic ideological issues
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and have biases toward partiespositions.7 Let i be the relative attachment of citizen i to party Bs
positions (i.e. i = iB   iA) which can be positive or negative. Idiosyncratic party attachments
are unknown by political parties but group-specic distributions are common knowledge. Relative
party attachments in group j are drawn from a uniform distribution over the range [ja; 
j
b] with
average ideological attachment j = (ja+
j
b)=2 and density 
j = 1=(jb ja). The density measures
the ideological heterogeneity within the group and therefore  =
PJ
j=1 
jj denotes the weighted
average of ideological heterogeneity across groups. I assume that in the overall population there is
no aggregate ideological bias and suppose that ideologically neutral voters, i = 0, are present in
all groups.
Citizens also care about political parties running in the elections. I assume that between the
announcement of taxation and spending policies and the elections each party receives aggregate
shocks, "A and "B, common to all voters in the population. I normalize the common shock, " =
"B   "A, which measures the relative popularity of party B with respect to party A at the time
of elections. For simplicity, I assume that the common shock " is uniformly distributed, and
independently from i; with density  and expected value, E("), equal to 0.
"  U [  1
2 
;
1
2 
] (14)
The timing of the political game is as follows: 1) Political parties simultaneously and non-
cooperatively credibly announce their taxation and spending policy platforms, xA = (tA; fsjAgJj=1;
fhjgAgJj=1) and xB = (tB; fsjBgJj=1; fhjgBgJj=1). 2) The random idiosyncratic, i, and common
popularity, ", shocks are realized. 3) Citizens vote for the party that they prefer, fA;Bg. 4)
Whichever party P that obtains the majority of the votes, wins the election and implements the
economic policy promised at the beginning of the game. Finally, 5) individuals make labor and
consumption choices through competitive markets, fcjmP ; hjmP ; njmP gJj=1.
3.1 Stages of the Game
The political game presented above has three stages: economic policy announcements, elections
and market decisions. I characterize the Subgame Perfect Nash equilibrium of the political game
by backward induction.
3.1.1 Third Stage: Market Decisions
Once one of the parties, P 2 fA;Bg, wins the election, it is committed to implement economic
policies, xP = (tP ; fsjP gJj=1; fhjgP gJj=1). Then, individuals within each ability group decide their
labor e¤ort, fnjP gJj=1, and whether making purchases of private health care, fhjmP gJj=1, with their
net income, fzjP gJj=1. The residual net income is allocated to the consumption of numeraire com-
7 In order to model individuals concerns on non-economic issues, I use the partisanship stochastic probabilistic
voting model proposed by Persson and Tabellini (1999). See Persson and Tabellini (2000) for a detailed discussion.
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modity, fcjmP gJj=1. Therefore, the budget constraint of individuals who belong to ability group j
under Ps government is given by:
cjmP + phh
j
mP = w
j(1  tP )njP + sjP  zjP 8j (15)
Hence, given income taxation and transfers policies under the government of party P , xP , the
choice problem for ability type j individuals, who participate in the labor market, can be written
as:
max
hjmP ;n
j
P
U j(cj ; hj ; lj) = u(wj(1  tP )njP + sjP   phhjmP ; hjgP + hjmP ; 1  njP ) s.to. hjmP  0 8j
(16)
The optimal market choices, (hjmP ; n
j
P ), for individuals endowed with ability type 
j must
satisfy the FOCs for a maximum such that:
[hjmP ] uh + 
j
h = phuc 8j (17)
[njP ] w
j(1  tP )uc = ul 8j (18)
jhh
j
mP = 0 ; 
j
h  0 8j (19)
where jh is the multiplier associated to the non-negativity constraint, h
j
mP  0. Depending on
implemented economic policies, for each group j the choice problem (16) yields two alternatives.
In the rst alternative, elected government P levies income taxes and fund transfers such that the
quality of health services publicly provided to group j, hjgP > 0, given available net income, z
j
P , is
overprovided. Individuals would prefer to modify their current resource allocation by a reduction of
one unit of the targeted resources through in-kind transfers compensated by a one unit increase in
cash transfers. Therefore, when in-kind transfers are overprovided, individuals decide do not make
purchases of health care, hjmP = 0, and devote the net income obtained by their labor e¤ort to the
consumption of numeraire commodity, cjmP = z
j
P . The labor supply function of group j when there
exists overprovision, njP = n
j
P (ph; w
j(1  tP ); sjP ; hjgP ), is implicitly dened by:
wj(1  tP )uc(zjP ; hjgP ; 1  njP ) = ul(zjP ; hjgP ; 1  njP ) 8j (20)
where zjP = w
j(1  tP )njP + sjP . Furthermore, overprovision in group j implies:
uh(z
j
P ; h
j
gP ; 1  njP ) < phuc(zjP ; hjgP ; 1  njP ) 8j (21)
Hence, given individualschoices in competitive labor markets and targeted in-kind transfers
and net income under the government of party P , the indirect utility function for ability type j
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individuals when their consumption of health care is overprovided (OV ) is given by:
V jOVP  V jP (ph; wj(1  tP ); sjP ; hjgP ) = u(wj(1  tP )njP + sjP ; hjgP ; 1 njP ) 8j and for P 2 fA;Bg
(22)
As an alternative, elected government could raise income taxes and allocate transfers such that
the quality of health services publicly provided to group j, hjgP , given available net income, z
j
P ,
is either underprovided or enough-provided. Only when health care is underprovided individuals
make private purchases in private markets, hjmP > 0.
8 In this case, individuals market choices are
identical to the case where group j would receive the market value of targeted in-kind transfers in
terms of numeraire commodity. Then, let IjP = s
j
P + phh
j
gP be the implicit cash transfers targeted
to group j. The optimality conditions of individuals choice in group j yields:
uh(z
j
P   phhjmP ; hjgP + hjmP ; 1  njP ) = phuc(zjP   phhjmP ; hjgP + hjmP ; 1  njP ) 8j (23)
wj(1  tP )uc(zjP   phhjmP ; hjgP +hjmP ; 1 njP ) = ul(zjP   phhjmP ; hjgP +hjmP ; 1 njP ) 8j (24)
where zjP = w
j(1  tP )njP + sjP and hjmP  0. These conditions implictly dene both the ordinary
demand function for private health care, hjmP = h
j
m(ph; w
j(1   tP ); IjP ), and the labor supply
function, njP = n
j
P (ph; w
j(1   tP ); IjP ), for group j conditional to income taxation and transfers
implemented by party P .
Given net income, targeted in-kind transfers and market choices in competitive markets under
the government of party P , the indirect utility function for individuals with ability type j whose
consumption of health care is not overprovided (UN) is given by:
V jUNP  V jP (ph; wj(1 tP ); IjP ) = u(wj(1 tP )njP +sjP phhjmP ; hjmP+hjgP ; 1 njP ) 8j and for P 2 fA;Bg
(25)
3.1.2 Second Stage: Voting
Citizens vote for the political party that they prefer given income taxation and spending policy
proposals, their ideological biases and the popularity of parties. At the voting stage, individu-
als value economic policy platforms taking into account that they can make private decisions in
competitive labor and health care markets. Therefore, individualsvaluation of income taxation
and transfers policies are summarized by either indirect utility function (22) or (25) depending on
whether quality of health care publicly funded is overprovided or not given the available income in
group j implied by proposed policies.
Suppose that a member of group j is promised economic policies xjA = (tA; s
j
A; h
j
gA) by party A
8 In the particular case where government targets in-kind transfers and net income to group j such that health
care is enough provided, individuals do not supplement health care in private markets, hjP = h
j
gP . Individuals would
be indi¤erent between a one unit reduction of in-kind transfers compensated by an increase in the targeted amount
of cash transfers by the same amount of resources.
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and xjB = (tB; s
j
B; h
j
gB) by B. Given ideological biases and the popularity of politicians, citizen i
in group j votes for party A over B conditional on policy platforms (xjA; x
j
B) if:
V jA(x
j
A) > V
j
B(x
j
B) + i + " (26)
where V jP = fV jOVP ; V jUNP g 8j and for P 2 fA;Bg. While voting for party B if this inequality is
reversed.
In each ability group, given proposed policy platforms, there might be citizens whose idiosyn-
cratic ideological bias, j , makes them indi¤erent between voting for party A and B. The swing
voter type in each group j is dened as:
j(xjA; x
j
B; ") = V
j
A(x
j
A)  V jB(xjB)  " (27)
where V jP = fV jOVP ; V jUNP g 8j and for P 2 fA;Bg. Voters who belong to group j with and
ideological bias i below (above) the cut-o¤ ideological type nd optimal to vote for A (B). I
assume that a swing voter who is indi¤erent between both parties randomizes equally over the set
of parties. Previously, I assumed that in each group the idiosyncratic ideological preferences are
uniformly distributed. Furthermore, there does not exist an ideological bias to any of the parties
in the overall population. Therefore, the overall vote share for party A is dened as:
SA(xA; xB; ") =
1
2
+
JX
j=1
jjj(xjA; x
j
B; ") (28)
The complement share of citizens votes for party B, SB.
3.1.3 First Stage: Policy Announcements
At the rst stage of the game, when politicians announce policy platforms, the common popularity
shock has not been observed. The swing voter type in each group depends on both economic policy
proposals and the realized value of the shock, j = j(xjA; x
j
B; "). Hence, parties are uncertain
about the identity of pivotal voters in each group and voting is a random variable from politicians
perspective. Under majority voting, o¢ ce-motivated politicians care about the probability of ob-
taining the support of more than half of the population. Given the denition of the swing voter
type in each group (27) and distributional assumptions on ideological biases and popularity shock,
the probability that party A wins the election can be expressed as:
P (xA; xB) =
1
2
+
 

24 JX
j=1
jj
h
V jA(x
j
A)  V jB(xjB)
i35 (29)
Party B anticipates winning the election with the complementary probability 1   P (xA; xB).
This probability function captures partiesuncertainty regarding electoral outcome and summa-
rizes expected voting behavior of citizens given announced policies and implied market decisions.
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Probabilistic voting introduces heterogeneity at citizensvoting decisions because of the presence
of idiosyncratic party attachments. Thus, partiesexpected number of votes are a smooth function
of policy platforms. Furthermore, given that both group-specic distributions of ideological biases
and individualsutility functions are continuous, the probability of winning is a continuous func-
tion in both policy platforms. Moreover, this probability function is also strictly concave in party
As platform and strictly convex in party Bs policy proposal. These properties are insured by
assumptions on strict concavity of votersutility functions and uniform distribution of ideological
biases.9
Taking the opponents policy choice problem as given, each political party chooses a linear
tax over labor income and a combination of cash and in-kind transfers for each ability group,
xP = (tP ; fsjP gJj=1; fhjgP gJj=1) for P 2 fA;Bg, that maximizes its chances of winning elections
subject to governments budget constraint and non-negativity constraints. Parties take into account
citizensexpected voting decisions (stage 2 ) and individualschoices in competitive labor and health
care markets (stage 3 ). Thus, the policy choice problem of party A is given by:
max
tP ;fsjP gJj=1;fhjgP gJj=1
P (xA; xB) s.to. (13) and 0  tA  1 ; sjA  0 8j ; hjgA  0 8j
(30)
Political party B makes policy announcements simultaneously. Its policy choice problem is
symmetric to the one of party A.
4 Political Equilibrium
Denition: A Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE) in the electoral competition game is
i) a menu of income taxation and group-specic transfers announced by each political party P ,
xNP = (t
N
P ; fsjNP gJj=1; fhjNgP gJj=1); ii) a voting decision for each individual of the polity, fA;Bg; and
iii) individualsprivate choices in competitive labor and health care markets under Ps government,
fcjNmP ; hjNmP ; njNP gJj=1, such that:
1) Each political party commits to a policy proposal that maximizes its chances of winning
elections subject to the governments budget constraint, taking into account both citizensexpected
voting and market decisions and its opponents policy choice problem.
2) Each citizen votes for the party that provides her with the maximum well-being given
proposed economic policies, ideological biases, popularity shock and decisions in competitive labor
and health care markets.
3) Each individual, given implemented economic policies by the winner party, chooses the
labor e¤ort and private health care services that maximize her well-being.
9See Persson and Tabellini (2000) for a discussion on the properties of objective functions in probabilistic voting
games. Austen-Smith and Banks (2005) and Banks and Duggan (2006) provide a detailed technical argument on
continuity and concavity properties.
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In the electoral competition game with competitive markets, a SPNE in pure strategies exists
and it is unique.10 Furthermore, in this unique equilibrium, both parties propose the same income
tax and distribution of cash and in-kind transfers across groups, xNA = x
N
B = x
N . This policy
convergence follows because both parties make simultaneous policy announcements facing exactly
the same policy choice problem. Both political parties aim to maximize their chances of winning
elections constrained by the same taxation policy tools. Hence, regardless of which party wins
the election, the electoral competition game implements the same allocation of resources once
individuals make private choices in competitive markets, fcjN ; hjN ; njNgJj=1.
Furthermore, when parties commit to the same policy proposals, citizenseconomic well-being
would be the same under the government of either party A or B, V j(xjA) = V
j(xjB) 8j. There-
fore, in equilibrium non-biased voters (i.e. i = 0) in each group are expected to be indi¤erent
between parties. Hence, politicians choose income taxation and transfers in order to court ide-
ologically neutral voters who could swing their vote. I characterize equilibrium policies, xN =
(tN ; fsjNgJj=1; fhjNg gJj=1), when politicians undertake political redistribution.
4.1 Linear Income Taxation
Politicians need to raise income taxes in order to undertake political redistribution. Higher tax
rates levied over labor income yield more revenue for redistribution. However, income taxation
reduces votersprivate utility and therefore raising taxes has a negative impact on partiesexpected
number of votes. Furthermore, taxes over earned income lead workers to reduce their labor e¤ort.
Therefore, these behavioral responses of workers decrease the endogenous pool of resources available
for political redistribution. Hence, the size of the income tax choosen by politicians is limited by
both its negative e¤ect on chances of winning elections and individualsadjustment of their labor
e¤ort.11
For both political parties, the equilibrium choice of income taxation satises the following
relation:
tN
1  tN =  
COV (j ; yj)
JP
j=1
jyj"jcn;w
(31)
where j is the net electoral marginal valuation of income in group j; yj is the market income of
individuals of group j; and "jcn;w is the group js compensated labor supply elasticity.
This equation shows how various factors a¤ect the equilibrium linear income tax choosen by
political parties and it is close to the expression that results from the classical optimal income
10See Mathematical Appendix A for a formal discussion on the existence and uniqueness of the political equilibrium.
11See Mathematical Appendix B for a detailed characterization of the equilibrium linear income tax choosen by
o¢ ce-motivated political parties.
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taxation problem with linear tax and uniform cash transfers.12I extend that framework allowing
for group-specic transfers. Furthermore, now the implemented tax rate is not the optimal choice
of a benevolent planner who aims to maximize social welfare. However, income tax rate is the
equilibrium outcome of the electoral competition between o¢ ce-motivated politicians. I discuss
with some detail the di¤erent elements that a¤ect the political choice of the income tax.13
Consider that politicians had available one unit of numeraire that could be targeted to whichever
group j. Then, the net electoral marginal valuation of the income promised to individuals who
belong to group j, j , is given by:
j =
 
j
 uc

+ twj
@nj
@sj
(32)
The rst term measures the marginal e¤ect on parties chances of winning by targeting an
additional unit of numeraire commodity to a swing voter in group j. This contribution is normalized
by the value of a unit of numeraire to politicians (i:e: it is converted in numeraire units dividing by
the equilibrium shadow price of government revenue, ). This marginal contribution depends on
three elements: the marginal utility of consumption, uc; the relative concentration of pivotal voters
in group j with respect to the average concentration of swing voters in the overall population, j=;
and the uncertainty regarding the electoral outcome measured by the parameter  .
The second component captures the e¤ect of behavioral responses of workers to cash transfers
into governments revenues. In particular, asssuming that leisure is a normal good implies that an
additional unit of numeraire targeted to a voter in group j reduces her labor e¤ort. Therefore, per
each unit of labor supply reduction there is a twj marginal cost of revenues.
Equation (31) shows that the larger the covariance between the net electoral marginal valuation
and the market income in each group is, the greater the income tax rate announced by politicians.
The magnitude of this covariance depends on the dispersion of yj and j . Market income exhibits
a higher dispersion when the distribution of abilities across groups is more unequal. The dispersion
of j depends on both the relative concentration of swing voters among groups and the concavity
of utility over consumption of numeraire.
Furthermore, income tax rate proposed by parties is larger when the compensated labor supply
elasticities to changes in net wages of the groups are low. Compensated elasticities capture the
ine¢ ciencies introduced by income taxation and measure the income and tax revenues that are
lost per unit of reduction in labor e¤ort. Politicians consider the impact of these elasticities more
relevant for groups with larger productivities and size because of the larger lost in tax revenues.
12See seminal work on optimal income taxation by Mirrlees (1971); Stiglitz (1987) and Kaplow (2008) for a discus-
sion of the linear income tax case.
13The exposition of the results is close to Stiglitz (1987) and Kaplow (2008) in order to highlight both similarities
and di¤erences with optimal taxation literature in which governments are benevolent.
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Hence, larger di¤erences in the relative concentration of swing voters among groups; greater
individuals aversion to risk; higher inequality in the distribution of abilities across groups; and
lower compensated labor supply elasticities contribute to a higher equilibrium tax rate which allows
politicians to fund larger transfers.
Politicians do not have incentives to undertake political redistribution in the particular cases in
which either the deadweight losses associated with income taxation are huge or there does not exist
dispersion of yj and j .14 Nevertheless, I focus on the general case in which there exists dispersion
in both productivity and concentration of pivotal voters among groups. Furthermore, e¢ ciency
costs of taxation are not excessive.15
4.1.1 Overprovision of Health Services
In equilibrium, political parties commit to a linear income tax and a combination of transfers such
that the quality of health services publicly funded for each group, given their available net income,
is overprovided. Overprovision implies:
uh(z
jN ; hjNg ; 1  njN ) < phuc(zjN ; hjNg ; 1  njN ) 8j (33)
where the equilibrium net income is given by zjN = wjnjN (1   tN ) + sjN , with sjN  0. Thus,
politicians constrain individuals to consume more health services than they would buy in private
markets if targeted resources were given in cash. Why do politicians who require the support of
citizens to be elected might have incentives to overprovide the consumption of goods? The political
reason relies on the fact that overprovision might increase the scope of political redistribution which
is limited by distortions generated by income taxation.
In order to examine under which conditions there exists political incentives for in-kind redistri-
bution, consider an economy in which both political parties do not overprovide health care. In that
case, politicians announce the same set of policies which implies that health care publicly funded
in all groups is either under or enough provided. Suppose that one party, for instance A, decides
to modify its policy platform. In particular, for a given income tax, party A increases in-kind
transfers targeted to group k reducing the funding of cash transfers. Suppose that the magnitude
of the policy change involves that now in-kind transfers in group k are overprovided. Whats the
e¤ect of this change in policy platforms on the economic well-being of non-biased voters in group
k? I nd that pivotal voterswell-being raises, dV kA=dh
k
g > 0, when the change in the composition
of targeted transfers increases individualsincentives to work.16
14For instance, politicians would not have incentives to redistribute when groups exhibit both the same productivity
and concentration of non-biased voters. See Appendix B for additional details.
15See Salanié (2003) for a discussion on the e¢ ciency cost of taxation and estimates of the compensated elasticities
of labor supply.
16See Mathematical Appendix C for a technical proof that shows the conditions under which overprovision is a
political equilibrium. The exposed procedure follows closely Gahvari (1994) who analyzes the e¤ect of cash and
in-kind transfers in labor supply and tax revenues when government is benevolent.
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Workers raise their labor e¤ort as long as leisure is a normal good and there exists complemen-
tarities betwen labor and the good subject to in-kind transfers, (i.e. @lck=@hkg < 0, where l
c is the
compensated demand of leisure). The latter condition holds when either: i) preferences between
leisure and goods subject to in-kind transfers are weakly separable, @lck=@hkg = 0; or ii) leisure
and health are Hicks substitutes, @lck=@ph > 0. The raise in labor e¤ort enlarges aggregate labor
income and therefore governments revenues for any level of income taxation. That increment of
resources allows politicians targeting group k with larger in-kind transfers reducing targeted cash
in a lower magnitude. Party As change of policy platforms modies the identity of expected swing
voters in group k. Non-biased individuals and a share of voters with attachments to party B would
be expected to vote for party A. Thus, this net gain in the expected number of votes provides
incentives to modify the composition of redistributive transfers. Furthermore, these incentives are
also present in the rest of the groups and therefore parties would deviate from the initial set of pol-
icy platforms. Thus, it is showed that either under or enough provision cannot be an equilibrium.
Hence, when there exists complementarities between labor and goods subject to in-kind transfers
(@lck=@hkg < 0), politicians overprovide the consumption of these goods for all the population. The
greater the complementarities are, the larger the rise in workers labor e¤ort and governments
tax revenues to fund redistributive transfers. Therefore, politicians would have more incentives for
overproviding these goods because it expands the scope of political redistribution which is limited
by the disincentive e¤ects created by income taxation.
4.1.2 In-Kind Transfers
In equilibrium, when political parties need to resort to in-kind transfers to compete for o¢ ce, the
publicly funded health care targeted to group j satises:
 

juh(z
jN ; hjNg ; 1  njN )
N
+ tNwj
dnjN
dhjNg
= ph 8j (34)
where the equilibrium net income is given by zjN = wjnjN (1   tN ) + sjN , with sjN  0. Hence,
for each group of voters, politicians equalize the marginal cost of funding in-kind transfers to
their marginal political valuation. This valuation consists of both the marginal contribution of
targeted in-kind transfers to partieschances of winning and their marginal e¤ect on tax revenues.
Overprovision of goods increases incentives to work, dnj=dhjg > 0, and therefore raises governments
resources by twj per each additional unit of time devoted to work.
The electoral competition between politicians leads to a distribution of in-kind transfers across
groups of voters that satises:
kuh(z
kN ; hkNg ; 1  nkN )
1  tNwk dnkN
dhkg
=
k
0
uh(z
k0N ; hk
0N
g ; 1  nk
0N )
1  tNwk0 dnk0N
dhk0g
8k; k0 2 f1; :::; Jg (35)
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The interplay of three elements determine the equilibrium allocation of in-kind transfers among
groups: i) the individualsrisk aversion over the consumption of the good subject to in-kind trans-
fers; ii) the concentration of swing voters in the group; and iii) its level of productivity.
By concavity of utility function, politicians have incentives to transfer resources toward low
ability groups because they exhibit higher marginal utility (i.e. lower market income). The larger
the risk aversion is, the lower the groupsdi¤erences in the consumption of the good. Furthermore,
politicians compete for pivotal non-biased voters who could swing their vote. Therefore, groups
with larger concentration of non-biased individuals are favored in the allocation of in-kind transfers.
The e¤ect of concavity and swing voters in the political allocation of transfers is well-known.
Distributive politics points out how these factors a¤ect the expected electoral returns of targeting
transfers among groups (Lindbeck and Weibull, 1987; Dixit and Londregan, 1996). The novelty
of this contribution relies on considering the e¤ect of transfers on workersincentives to work and
governments revenues.
Income redistribution reduces workerslabor e¤ort and therefore the tax basis to fund redistrib-
utive transfers. Previous section discusses under which conditions overproviding in-kind transfers
might mitigate the disincentive e¤ects of taxation. Furthermore, an extra unit of labor e¤ort for
high productivity groups generates more aggregate labor income and enlarges governments rev-
enues for any level of taxation. Therefore, high productivity is a factor that contributes positively
to receive larger in-kind transfers. Politicians have incentives to target high productivity groups
with in-kind rather than cash to reduce tax losses generated by income redistribution. Nevertheless,
the impact of this component on the targeted transfer depends on the groupselasticities of labor
supply to in-kind transfers.
4.2 Cash Transfers
Politicians can also undertake income redistribution through di¤erential targeting of cash transfers
among groups of voters. However, parties do not have incentives to target cash transfers to groups
in which the net electoral marginal valuation of promising one unit of numeraire, j , is lower or
equal than than the cost of the transfer.17 Therefore, group j does not receive cash when:
 

juc(w
jnjN (1  tN ); hjNg ; 1  njN )
N
+ tNwj
dnjN
dsj
 1 8j (36)
Otherwise, politicians promise cash transfers. In equilibrium, when group k is targeted with
transfers, politicians equalize the marginal contribution of the transfer to their chances of winning,
expressed in terms of numeraire, to its marginal cost. This cost consists of the direct e¤ect of
funding the transfer and the lost of tax revenues because of behavioral responses of workers. In
17See Mathematical Appendix E for technical details on necessary conditions for targeting cash transfers and
equilibrium characterization of the distribution of transfers across groups of voters.
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particular, cash transfers reduce labor e¤ort through the income e¤ect (i:e: dnj=dsj < 0). Hence,
in equilibrium the cash transfer allocated to group k satises:
 

kuc(z
kN ; hkNg ; 1  nkN )
N
= 1  tNwk dn
kN
dsk
(37)
where the equilibrium net income is given by zkN = wknkN (1  tN ) + skN .
Furthermore, for any pair of groups targeted with cash transfers, k and k0, the equilibrium
relative allocation of transfers among groups is given by:
kuc(z
kN ; hkNg ; 1  nkN )
1  tNwk dnkN
dsk
=
k
0
uc(z
k0N ; hk
0N
g ; 1  nk
0N )
1  tNwk0 dnk0N
dsk0
(38)
The factors that a¤ect the electoral incentives to redistribute among groups through cash are the
same that the elements previously discussed for in-kind transfers. Groups with higher concentration
of swing voters and lower productivities (i.e. higher marginal utility of consumption) exhibit larger
electoral benets of being targeted. On the other side, politicians must consider the di¤erential
impact on tax revenues of targeting cash transfers among groups with di¤erent productivities.
Indeed, the cost of targeting cash transfers is greater for groups with larger productivities because
of the decrease of their labor e¤ort represents a larger loss of tax revenues per unit of labor supply
reduction. Hence, politicians have incentives to target low rather than high productivity groups
with cash in order to reduce income and tax revenues losses generated by political redistribution.
5 Normative Analysis
When politicians are constrained to raise revenues through income taxation, political redistribution
generates allocative ine¢ ciencies. Taxation over earned income introduces distortions in labor
markets through the substitution e¤ect reducing individualsincentives to work. Indeed, the rate
at which individuals are willing to trade leisure for consumption is lower than their competitive
wage rate:
MRSjNl;c = w
j(1  tN ) < wj for all j 2 f1; :::; Jg (39)
Furthermore, politicians implement redistributive policies that create distortions in goods mar-
kets. In fact, under the conditions previously discussed, the allocation of resources that results from
the political process, fcjN ; hjN ; njNgJj=1, is such that the consumption of health care is overpro-
vided for all individuals in the economy. Hence, in each income group, the rate at which consumers
are willing to trade health care quality for numeraire commodity is lower than the rate at which
the economy is able to transform numeraire into health care:
MRSjNh;c < MRTh;c = q for all j 2 f1; :::; Jg (40)
Nevertheless, the feasibility of in-kind transfers reduces ine¢ ciencies with respect to a situation
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in which governments were able to redistribute only through cash transfers. By overproviding in-
kind transfers, politicians introduce a friction in the consumption of goods. However, this distortion
provides workers incentives to increase their labor e¤ort with respect to a situation in which targeted
transfers were given in cash. Therefore, it reduces the distortions in labor markets generated by
income taxation. Overall, politicians choose redistributive schedules that increase the well-being of
all individuals.
The increase in allocative e¢ ciency can be showed as follows. The economic well-being of citizens
when publicly funded health care is either under or enough provided is equivalent to the case in
which the same amount of resources was targeted in cash.18 Furthermore, I showed the conditions
under which, for any level of income taxation, all individuals increase their well-being when health
care is overprovided. In that case, politicians are able to raise in-kind reducing cash transfers in a
lower magnitude. Hence, it is shown that voters can be made better o¤ when politicians are able
to redistribute income through in-kind transfers.
Thus, the allocation that results from the political game when in-kind transfers are available is
Pareto superior to the case in which redistributive spending is restricted to cash transfers. Further-
more, the larger the complementarities between publicly funded goods and labor are, the greater
the e¢ ciency gains. Hence, the composition of redistributive spending choosen by politicians is not
neutral in terms of e¢ ciency.
Individuals work more and their consumption of health care is overprovided. However, citizens
are better o¤ with respect to a situation were only cash transfers were available because redis-
tributive schedules enlarge their net income. Indeed, the equilibrium income tax is lower than the
implemented tax rate when in-kind transfers are not feasible. On the one hand, the increase in labor
e¤ort raises the marginal utility of leisure, ul. On the other hand, larger net income decreases the
marginal utility of consumption, uc. Therefore, the marginal rate of substitution between income
and leisure for each group, MRSl;c, is higher when in-kind transfers are feasible. In equilibrium,
this marginal rate of substituion is equal to the net wage, wj(1   tN ). Hence, the net wage is
larger with respect to a situation in which only cash transfers are available and therefore a lower
equilibrium income tax rate is implemented. Thus, an economy where in-kind transfers are feasible
exhibits lower distortions in labor markets with respect to a situation in which politicians were
constrained to redistribute income only through cash transfers.
Normative analysis justies the use of in-kind transfers to increase the e¢ ciency of the taxation
system. Literature relies on an important contribution due to Guesnerie and Roberts (1984) who
show how forced consumption of goods which are complements to labor can made all individuals
18 In the case that politicians do not overprovide consumption and target group j with in-kind transfers, hjg, these
are equivalent to a cash transfer of value Ij = phhjg. Therefore, in this situation cash and in-kind transfers are
equivalent in terms of individualswell-being.
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better o¤ when the economy is in a second best because of the presence of distortions.19 For the
particular case in which the government is only able to levy linear taxes over labor income, Gahvari
(1994, 1995) points out the welfare-enhancing role of in-kind transfers in an economy with uniquely
two groups, the rich and the poor. Gahvari nds that government could decrease cash transfers and
choose a uniform level of in-kind transfers that reduces distortions generated by income taxation.
The funding of in-kind transfers results in overprovision (undeprovision) of goods for the poor (rich)
that leads to an increase (decrease) of their labor e¤ort. Overall, the government is able to enlarge
its tax revenues and funds larger transfers that increase the welfare of all individuals.
However, why should elected politicians implement Pareto improving policies? This paper
points out that when governments are elected by citizens they would have incentives to choose
redistributive policies that minimize e¢ ciency losses created by taxation. Nevertheless, it is impor-
tant to notice that the reason is not a welfare improving goal of a benevolent government. Instead,
politicians who strive to be elected propose redistributive schedules that enlarge the scope of re-
distribution which is limited by distortions. Politicians aims to enlarge resources to court pivotal
voters who could swing their vote. Therefore, it is the competition for non-biased voters that leads
politicians to choose policies that yield to constrained e¢ cient allocations.
This e¢ ciency result contrasts with a signicant contribution by Epple and Romano (1996) in
which in-kind transfers emerge as an ine¢ cient tool of income redistribution. Instead, this paper
shows that when income is the result of labor e¤ort and policies modify individualsincentives to
work, redistribution through in-kind rather than cash might increase e¢ ciency. Furthermore, the
reduction of welfare losses attainable by the political mechanism analyzed in this paper are larger
than e¢ ciency gains explored in the normative literature. By exploiting probabilistic voting I can
remove the constraint that transfers must be uniform. Once di¤erential targeting of transfers is
feasible, politicians can design redistributive schedules that increase labor e¤ort of all individuals re-
gardless of their productivity. Therefore, it provides larger reductions in the distortions introduced
by income taxation.
These results show the potential role of electoral competition to increase allocative e¢ ciency
in economies which allocations of resources are the result of a political process. This idea was
rst raised by Wittman (1989,1995) who suggested it as an important feature of the competition
between politicians who strive to be elected. Furthermore, few contributions have analyzed how
the competition for pivotal citzens who could swing their vote improves e¢ ciency. One exception
is Besley (2007) who proposes a framework to analyze groups inuence on policy depending on
individualsattachments to parties. That set up is adopted by Besley, Persson and Sturm (2010)
who showed how the competition for non-biased voters in the US states leads to pro-economic
growth policies and e¢ ciency gains. Another example in the literature is Lopez-Rodriguez (2010)
who discusses the role of electoral competition for pivotal voters to achieve allocative e¢ ciency in
19See Currie and Gahvari (2008) for an exhaustive review of the normative literature and a discussion on the role
of in-kind transfers in second best economies.
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the presence of market imperfections such as external e¤ects.20 In the current paper, I show how the
competition for non-biased voters leads politicians to redistribute resources through tax-transfers
schedules that minimize the e¢ ciency cost of income taxation.
6 Conclusions
This paper investigates the scope of income redistribution when it is a political decision undertaken
by elected politicians. The political incentives for redistribution are examined through an electoral
competition model which provides interesting new insights. I rst show that politicians have in-
centives to raise taxes and modify the market distribution of income to be elected. Nevertheless,
when politicians are constrained to levy taxes on labor income the extent of political redistribution
is limited by distortions and output losses created by income taxation. In order to mitigate these
limitations, I show that politicians who compete for o¢ ce might fund in-kind transfers and overpro-
vide the consumption of goods which are complements to labor. This policy increases individuals
labor e¤ort with respect to a situation in which only cash transfers are available. As a result,
politicians extend resources for political redistribution which allows them to fund larger transfers
to court pivotal voters.
An appealing contribution of this paper is its focus on the positive analysis of policymaking. I
point out that the reason for redistribution and the characterization of redistributive schedules does
not result from the optimal choice of a benevolent government who maximizes a normative criteria
of social justice. However, it is the equilibrium outcome of a political process between politicians
and voters. Furthermore, the normative properties of the political allocation are also suggestive. In
spite of that redistribution through distortionary policy tools introduces ine¢ ciencies, I nd that
political competition can be welfare improving. In particular, I show how the electoral competition
for marginal voters who could swing their vote might improve the e¢ ciency of the taxation system.
This paper extends the literature of distributive politics examining how the political allocation
of transfers depends on the e¤ect of redistribution on individualsincentives to work. In particular,
this paper provides a framework in which income is the result of labor e¤ort, and politicians are
constrained to raise revenues through distortionary taxation tools. This allows to analyze the trade-
o¤ faced by politicians between e¢ ciency and political redistribution. Furthermore, I contribute to
the literature examining the case in which not only cash but also in-kind transfers can be targeted
across groups of voters. This gives interesting insights about how behavioral responses of workers
to redistribution a¤ect the composition of redistributive spending.
Some extensions of the proposed distributive politics framework with distortionary taxation are
worthy to be considered for further research. As an example, I might allow for the possibility of
20Blomquist and Christiansen (1999) also point out the potential e¢ ciency gains generated by political competition.
In particular, they show how in the presence of both asymmetric information and tastes for redistribution toward
low ability individuals, politicians that compete for o¢ ce might implement policies that improve e¢ ciency and reach
distributive goals.
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commodity taxation over the consumption of goods. For instance, politicians could also subsidize
goods that are complements to labor in order to stimulate labor e¤ort. This extension would permit
us to analyze the e¤ect of both price and quantity interventions on political redistribution.
Other venue for research would consist of analyzing how political redistribution a¤ects the
extensive margin responses of individuals in labor markets. I developed the case in which everyone
participates into the labor market. However, empirical evidence shows that individuals responses to
taxation policy are specially signicant in the extensive margin (Eissa and Liebman, 1996). Indeed,
literature has focused on designing optimal tax-transfers schedules that increase the incentives to
participate in labor markets (Saez, 2002). Hence, it would be worthy to examine whether in-kind
rather than cash transfers could provide incentives to participate in labor market. Furthermore,
the implementation of these schedules should be rationalized not by the presence of benevolent
governments but as the result of a political mechanism. Further research is necessary to analyze
these extensions which might provide interesting new results.
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MATHEMATICAL APPENDIX
A. EXISTENCE OF EQUILIBRIUM
Proposition 1 In the electoral competition game with competitive markets, a Subgame Perfect
Nash Equilibrium exists and it is unique.
Proof. [1] Given that i) the budget constraint of individuals who belong to ability group j under
the government of any party P 2 fA;Bg is dened by cjPm + phhjmP = wj(1   tP )njP + sjP  zjP .
Then, individuals budget sets are non-empty, compact and convex for all ability groups in the
economy; and ii) citizensutility functions are assumed to be continuous and strictly concave in
the consumption of numeraire, health care and leisure. Therefore, for any policy implemented by
P 2 fA;Bg, individuals choose a unique bundle of private health care and labor supply.
[2] For each individual, partiespolicy proposals, idiosyncratic ideological biases and popularity
shocks imply di¤erent utility levels under the government of either party A or B. Then, every citizen
votes for the party which yields him the maximum level of utility. When the utility level provided
by each party is the same, indi¤erent individuals randomize equally over the set of candidates and
vote for one of the parties.
[3] Given that for each political party i) the feasible set of strategies dened by the governments
budget constraint is non-empty, compact and convex; and ii) the probability of winning elections is
1) continuous in both policy platforms, (xA; xB); and 2) strictly concave in xP and strictly convex
in x P for P 2 fA;Bg. Then, according to Glicksbergs Fixed Point Theorem, there exists a unique
Nash Equilibrium in pure strategies in the rst stage of the game.
Therefore, given [1], [2] and [3], in the political game there exists a Subgame Perfect Nash
Equilibrium in pure strategies and it is unique.
B. EQUILIBRIUM INCOME TAXATION
Equilibrium policies are determined as the Nash Equilibrium of the rst stage of the game in
which both parties make simultaneous policy announcements. Taking the opponents policy choice
problem as given, each political party chooses a linear tax over labor income and a combination of
cash and in-kind transfers for each group, xP = (tP ; fsjP gJj=1; fhjgP gJj=1) for P 2 fA;Bg, that max-
imizes its chances of winning elections subject to government budget constraint and non-negativity
constraints. Parties take into account citizensexpected voting decisions (stage 2 ) and individuals
choices in competitive labor and health care markets (stage 3 ). Thus, the policy choice problem of
party A results from the maximization of the following Lagrangean:
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where A is the Lagrange multiplier associated to the budget constraint. The policy choice problem
of political party B is symmetric. There exists a unique equilibrium in which both parties propose
the same income tax and distribution of cash and in-kind transfers across groups, xNA = x
N
B = x
N .
Therefore, the First Order Conditions for both political parties evaluated at xNA = x
N
B = x
N
characterize equilibrium taxation and transfers policies:
[t]
 

JX
j=1
jj
dV j(xjN )
dt
+ N
24 JX
j=1
jwjnjN + tN
JX
j=1
jwj
dnjN
dt
35 = 0 (42)
[sj ]
 

jj
dV j(xjN )
dsj
+ N

tNjwj
dnjN
dsj
  j

+ jjNs = 0 8j (43)
[hjg]
 

jj
dV j(xjN )
dhjg
+ N
"
tNjwj
dnjN
dhjg
  jph
#
+ jjNh = 0 8j (44)
N
24 JX
j=1
jtNwjnjN  
JX
j=1
jsjN  
JX
j=1
jphh
jN
g
35 = 0 (45)
jNs s
jN = 0 8j ; jNs  0 8j (46)
jNh h
jN
g = 0 8j ; jNh  0 8j (47)
Individuals are at optimum before the introduction of policies, therefore by Envelope Theorem:
dV j(xjN )
dt
=  wjnjNuc ; dV
j(xjN )
dsj
= uc ;
dV j(xjN )
dhjg
= uh (48)
Furthermore, using the Slutsky relation, the e¤ect of income taxes on labor supply can be
expressed as follows:
@nj
@t
=  wj @n
cj
@wj
  wjnj @n
j
@sj
(49)
Consider that politicians had available one unit of numeraire which could be targeted to group
j. Then, the net electoral marginal valuation of income promised in group j, j , is given by:
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Adding over j the equilibrium FOC for group-specic cash transfers (43) and arranging terms
gives:
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Given the denition of j , equation (51) captures the equilibrium weighted average of the
marginal electoral valuation of income across groups which can be expressed as:
JX
j=1
jj = 1 (52)
Making use of (48) and (49), the equilibrium FOC for income tax (42) can be written as:
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Dividing by the shadow price of government revenue, , gives:
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Given the denition of the electoral marginal valuation of income in group j (50) and using
(52), the equilibrium condition sastises:
JX
j=1
jwjnj
24j   JX
j=1
jj +
t
1  t"
jc
n;w
35 = 0 (55)
where "jcn;w is the compensated elasticity of labor supply dened as:
"jcn;w =
@ncj
@wj
wj(1  t)
nj
(56)
Arranging terms, the equilibrium choice of income taxation satises the following expression:21
t
1  t =  
COV (j ; yj)
JP
j=1
jyj"jcn;w
(57)
21The procedure to obtain the equilibrium relation follows closely Stiglitz (1987) and Kaplow (2008). However, I
show how this expression arises as the equilibrium outcome of the electoral competition between politicians rather
than from the optimal choice of a benevolent planner.
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Furthermore, the equilibrium shadow price of revenue can be obtained solving for  using (51):
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Therefore, the equilibrium net marginal electoral valuation of income promised to group j is
given by:
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Notice that the equilibrium market allocation would be a political equilibrium (i.e. parties
propose do not undertake redistribution) if and only if this condition holds for all groups of the
economy:
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Therefore, the following relation must hold for any pair of groups, k and k0, of the economy:
kuc(w
knk   phhkm ; hkm ; 1  nk) = k
0
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m ; 1  nk
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This would be the case when all groups exhibit both the same productivity and concentration
of pivotal voters.
C. OVERPROVISION OF HEALTH SERVICES
In equilibrium, political parties choose a combination of policies that overprovide the consump-
tion of health services for all the population. In order to show this result, consider an economy
in which both parties do not overprovide health services.22Suppose that one party, for instance A,
deviates from the common policy announcement. In particular, for a given income tax, party A
increases in-kind transfers targeted to group k reducing the funding of cash transfers. This change
in policies involves that now in-kind transfers in group k are overprovided. Whats the e¤ect of
this change on the economic well-being of non-biased voters in group k?
The indirect utility function of non-biased individuals in group k when party A overprovides
health services is given by:
V kOVA  V kA(ph; wk(1  tA); hkgA; skA) = u(wk(1  tA)njA + skA; hkgA; 1  nkA ) (62)
22The logic and steps to proof the results follow closely Gahvari (1994, 1995) who analyzes the di¤erentiated e¤ect
of uniform cash and in-kind transfers in labor supply and tax revenues of an exogenous government. Nevertheless, I
work the case in which group-specic transfers are feasible and the government must be elected by citizens.
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Totally di¤erentiating (62) with respect to in-kind-transfers targeted to group k, yields:
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(63)
The combination of policies proposed by political party A is constrained to satisfy its budget
constraint given by:
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For a given income tax rate, tA > 0, totally di¤erentiating party As budget constraint with
respect to in-kind-transfers targeted to group k and solving for dskA=dh
k
gA yields:
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= tAw
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  ph (65)
Thus, introducing the value of dskA=dh
k
gA from (65) into (63) and arranging terms gives:
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Party A departs from a situation in which the consumption of health care is not overprovided,
therefore by Envelope Theorem:
@V kA
@hkg
  ph@V
k
A
@sk

= uh   phuc = 0 (67)
Hence, the e¤ect of the marginal change of transfers policy on economic well-being of non-biased
voters, dV kA=dh
k
g , depends on the sign of dn
k
A=dh
k
gA.
The ordinary labor supply function of a worker who belongs to group k when there exists
overprovision is given by:
nkOVA = n
k
A(ph; w
k(1  tA); hkgA; skA) (68)
Totally di¤erentiating this labor supply function with respect to in-kind transfers targeted to
group k, maintaining economic feasibility, yields:
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(69)
Given the value of dskA=dh
k
gA from (65), equation (69) can be expressed as:
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Therefore, arranging terms yields:
dnkA
dhkgA
=
ph
h
1
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Leisure was assumed to be a normal good, then @nkA=@s
k < 0. Therefore, the sign of the
denominator of (71) is positive. In order to analyze the sign of the numerator, consider the ordinary
demand function of leisure which is dened as the amount of time that individuals do not devote
to work, i.e. lk = 1  nk. The compensated demand of leisure conditional to policies promised by
party A, lckA , is obtained from the dual of the utility maximization problem that gives the ordinary
demand of leisure under party As government, lkA. Ordinary and compensated demand functions
for leisure are related by the identity:
lkA(ph; w
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h
ph; w
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Di¤erentiating (72) partially with respect to both cash and in-kind transfers to obtain:
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Introducing the value of @lckA =@V
k
A from (74) into (73) yields:
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Substituting (1   nkA) for lkA and multiplying both sides of (75) by the inverse of the in-kind
transfers unit cost yields:
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Substracting @nkA=@s
k from both sides and arranging terms gives:
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The rst component of the RHS of (77) is positive when either preferences between leisure and
the rest of the goods are weakly separable or leisure and health care are Hicks substitutes. On the
one side, Gahvari (1994) shows that weakly separability of preferences and normality of leisure are
enough to guarantee net substitutability, i:e. @lc= @hg < 0. This result holds in the current setting
because given (75), when @lkA= @h
k
g = 0 and @l
k
A= @s
k > 0, we also obtain net substitutability:
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=  @V
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As an alternative, Neary and Roberts (1980) show that when leisure and the good subject to in-
kind transfers are Hicks substitutes, i.e. @lck=@ph > 0, then there also exists net substitutatibility,
@lck=@hkg < 0.
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Furthermore, the second component of the RHS of (77) is negative. Indeed, party A overprovi-
sion of health care gives:
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Thus, given that leisure is a normal good, @nk=@sk < 0, we can obtain the sign of the e¤ect of
overprovision of in-kind transfers on labor supply (71):
1
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  @n
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@sk

> 0! dnkA=dhkg > 0 (80)
Therefore, for a given income tax, when party increases in-kind transfers and reduces cash
transfers in group k such that health services are overprovided, individuals have incentives to work
more, dnkA=dh
k
g > 0, as long as there exists complementarities between labor and the good subject
to transfers. It implies a change in the utility of pivotal voters:
dV kA
dhkg
= uctAw
k dn
k
A
dhkg
> 0 (81)
Hence, the change in policy platforms increases the economic well-being of non-biased voters in
group k:
D. EQUILIBRIUM IN-KIND TRANSFERS
Consider the equilibrium FOC for in-kind transfers promised to group j, (44). I showed that
the unique equilibrium involves overprovision of in-kind transfers for all groups (i.e. hjNg > 0 and
then jh = 0 for all j). Therefore, the equilibrium condition for group j yields:
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= ph 8j (82)
where the equilibrium net income is given by zjN = wjnjN (1  tN ) + sjN , with sjN  0.
Furthermore, given the equilibrium condition (44), the equilibrium distribution of in-kind trans-
fers across groups satises:
23See Gahvari (1994, 1995) for a detailed discussion of the results obtained by Neary and Roberts (1980).
32
kuh(z
kN ; hkNg ; 1  nkN )
1  tNwk dnkN
dhkg
=
k
0
uh(z
k0N ; hk
0N
g ; 1  nk
0N )
1  tNwk0 dnk0N
dhk0g
8k; k0 2 f1; :::; Jg (83)
E. EQUILIBRIUM CASH TRANSFERS
Consider the equilibrium FOC for cash transfers targeted to group j,(43). This equilibrium
condition shows that group j does not receive cash transfers when:
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Otherwise, parties promise cash transfers. In equilibrium, politicians target cash transfers to
group k such that the net electoral marginal valuation of income, kN , is equal to the direct cost
of lump sum cash transfers:
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where the equilibrium net income is given by zkN = wknkN (1  tN ) + skN .
Furthermore, given the equilibrium condition (43), for any pair of groups targeted with cash, k
and k0, the equilibrium relative allocation of transfers is given by:
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